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Abstract
The search-matching model is well suited for an equilibrium evaluation of labor
market policies. When those policies are targeted on some groups, the usual
juxtaposition of labor markets is however a shortcoming. There is a need for a
setting where workers’ productivitydepends on employ ment levels in all markets.
This paper provides such a theoretical setting. We ﬁrst develop a streamlined
model and then show that it can be extended to deal with interactions among
various labor market and ﬁscal policies. Simulation results focus on the eﬀects
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1“Countries can engineer a reduction of unemployment without a sacriﬁce of
low-end pay and a rise in low-end pay without a sacriﬁce of employment”
(Phelps , 2003, p. 11)
1 Introduction
To boost employment among the relatively low-paid, several countries have introduced
employment subsidies, in-work beneﬁts or cut in payroll taxes. In frictional labor
markets, these ﬁscal instruments change the quasi-rents that accrue to employers and
workers who have matched. This induces various eﬀects on ﬁrms’ and workers’ decisions
(vacancy creation, job-search eﬀort, investment in training and the like). Developing
a comprehensive view of these eﬀects is essential to evaluate whether these ﬁscal in-
struments can alleviate the unemployment problem. The equilibrium matching model
is admittedly a powerful setting for such an evaluation. However, it remains rather
simplistic for two reasons. First, policies targeted on speciﬁc groups require a model
in which interactions between labor markets are suﬃciently rich. However, the state-
of-the-art model juxtaposes the various labor markets. Second, tax reforms do not
take place in isolation. They interact with other existing policies. Some papers looked
at interactions with employment protection (see e.g. Mortensen and Pissarides, 2003,
henceforth ‘M-P’). Our paper introduces passive and active labor market policies.
To avoid a juxtaposition of labor markets while keeping the model tractable, we
consider an economy with a ﬁnal consumption good produced with two substitutable
intermediate goods. Each of them is produced with a single input, namely labor of
a given skill. The marginal product of labor is constant. An additional vacancy ac-
cessible to one type of worker eventually raises employment and the quantity of the
corresponding intermediate good. This decreases its productivity in the production
of the ﬁnal good and raises the productivity of the other intermediate good. These
changes in productivity modify the marginal value of labor and hence the quasi-rents
that accrue to employers and workers in all the economy. The decision to open new
vacancies and the eﬀort to search for a job are therefore aﬀected, too. These new in-
teractions complement the standard matching externalities (“caused by the congestion
that searching ﬁrms and workers cause for each other during trade”, Pissarides, 2000,
p.8).
A natural question is to what extent these extensions to the M-P model lead to
diﬀerent properties. To answer that question, as M-P, we introduce a tax-subsidy
schedule a + τ · w, where w is the net wage rate and τ is a positive proportional tax
rate. In the absence of untaxed income (such as home production), the marginal tax
τ is absorbed entirely by workers (through the net wages). If a is negative, it can be
2interpreted as a lump-sum employment subsidy (the interpretation retained below),
an in-work beneﬁt or a cut in payroll taxes. The employment subsidy raises the sur-
plus created when a worker and a vacancy have matched. Trough bargaining, the
employment subsidy is therefore partly used to raise net wages and partly to raise
employment. We show that the eﬀects of these tax instruments are deeply modiﬁed
in our enlarged setting. Take the case of a lump-sum employment subsidy targeted on
the low-skilled workers. We show that the state-of-the-art matching model overesti-
mates (respectively, underestimates) its eﬀect on low-skilled (respectively, high-skilled)
employment. A simulation exercise yields order of magnitudes of these various eﬀects.
The elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled labor lies between 1 and 2
(Cahuc and Zylberberg, 2004, p. 211). Consider an employment subsidy on the low-
skilled amounting to an ex ante reduction of 12% of their wage cost. With an elasticity
of substitution close to 1, the state-of-the-art matching model overestimates the im-
pact on low-skilled employment by 5% and underestimates the impact on high-skilled
employment by 0.7%. The diﬀerences are more important in terms of job-search eﬀort
and utility levels. Altogether, this leads to very diﬀerent normative conclusions. The
optimal low-skilled employment subsidy (i.e. the one maximizing net output) is 63%
larger in the state-of-the-art matching model.
This framework is then further generalized to deal with some labor market policies
(‘LMPs’) extensively used in OECD economies. Our aim is to show how a general-
ization of the M-P setting can be used as an evaluation instrument. We focus on the
interactions between employment subsidies and other LMPs. First, we introduce a
two-tier beneﬁt system (a stylized representation of many unemployment schemes).
As many authors (see e.g. Fredriksson and Holmlund, 2001, or Albrecht and Vroman,
2005), we assume that the fall from the ‘high’ to the ‘low’ beneﬁt occurs at a Poisson
rate. Compared to a ﬂat rate, time-varying unemployment beneﬁts have diﬀerent ef-
fects on job-search and on the wage bargain (Cahuc and Lehmann, 2000, Fredriksson
and Holmlund, 2001, and Coles and Masters). Second, we add short-duration active
labor market programs (counseling, job clubs, among others) that enhance the match-
ing eﬀectiveness of the participants. They inﬂuence job-search intensity (see Van der
Linden, 2005) and wage formation (see Holmlund and Lind´ en, 1993). However, by
assumption, this kind of active programs does not modify workers productivity. More
generally, the model takes the distribution of skills as given. On the role of wage sub-
sidies on human capital, see Heckman, Lochner and Cossa (2002) and Blundell, Costas
Dias and Meghir (2003).
In our computational experiments, participation to the labor market is endogenous
and a budget constraint of the State closes the model. Contrary to what is often
done, we do not contrast highly stylized European and Nord-American economies.
Instead, we calibrate and then simulate the model for a speciﬁc country plagued with
3a large low-skill problem (Belgium). As other countries of Western Europe, Belgium
extensively uses reductions of employers’ social security contributions targeted on low-
skilled workers.
Economists are nowadays more and more conscious that labor market reforms
should be comprehensive. Theoretical analyses of complementarities can be found
in Coe and Snower (1997), Orszag and Snower (1998), Chapter 4 of OECD (2003)
and Boone and van Ours (2004). Dealing with imperfectly substitutable skills and
endogenous search allows to extend this literature (see Joseph, Pierrard and Sneessens,
2004, and Pierrard, 2005). Empirical analyses, such as Nickell and Layard (1999) and
Belot and van Ours (2004), conclude that particular combinations of labor market in-
stitutions and policies can be responsible of good or bad performances on the labor
market. These analyses are however constrained by the availability of data. Some
features such as the proﬁle of unemployment beneﬁts can at best be proxied by some
aggregate indicators. Simulations of an equilibrium matching framework seem to be
preferable. To the best of our knowledge, the literature has paid scant attention to the
complementarities between employment subsidies on the one hand and the time-proﬁle
of unemployment beneﬁts and active labor market policies on the other hand.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. A streamlined
version is ﬁrst presented and then generalized to deal with active and passive programs.
Section 3 provides some descriptive information about the structure of taxes on earn-
ings and about Belgium. Section 4 explains how the model has been calibrated and
validated. Section 5 presents simulation results and Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 The framework
2.1 A middle ground
Consider a continuous-time model with a continuum of inﬁnitely-lived and risk-neutral
workers who have perfect foresight. Each ﬁrm is made of a single (ﬁlled or vacant) job.
There are frictions on the labor market. Other markets are instead frictionless (perfect
competition prevails). Assume two skill groups (high-skilled indexed by h and low-
skilled indexed by l) and skill-speciﬁc technologies. Let yn denote the ﬁxed marginal
products of labor (yl <y h) and En the employment levels (n ∈{ l,h}). To study the
eﬀects of reemployment bonus programs, Davidson and Woodbury (1993) developed
a matching model with diﬀerent types of workers where the total number of jobs was
given. So, their model can be seen as imposing El + Eh = constant. This extreme
assumption has since then been abandoned. The number of jobs is the consequence
of ﬁrms’ and workers’ decisions. The market for the ﬁnal good always clears and the
corresponding price can be chosen arbitrarily. This is equivalent to a setting where
4ﬁrms supply their optimal amount of a ﬁnal good facing a perfectly elastic demand. In
this alternative setting, total output supplied and exchanged, yl El + yh Eh, can take
any value. Since the price of the ﬁnal good can be normalized to one, the marginal
value of an additional type-n employee is constant and equal to yn. Consequently,
the parameters of the cost function are the only determinants of supply and supply
decisions taken by one ﬁrm do not aﬀect those of the other ones. This alternative to the
assumption of Davidson and Woodbury (1993) is nowadays standard in the literature.
Mortensen and Pissarides (1999) and Mortensen and Pissarides (2003) are examples.1
This alternative, henceforth the “M-P assumption”, remains quite restrictive however.
The present paper develops a more ﬂexible and more realistic model inspired by
Acemoglu (2001), Joseph, Pierrard and Sneessens (2004) and Pierrard (2005). The
novelty is very simple: Total output is now a convex combination of yl El and yh Eh.
The interpretation is the following. A single ﬁnal good (the numeraire) is produced
with two intermediate goods. Let Ql (respectively, Qh) denote the amount of the low-
skilled intermediate good (respectively, the high-skilled intermediate good). Keeping
yn constant, we have Qn = En·yn. The ﬁnal good production function is homogeneous







2 < 0,n∈{ h,l}. (1)
The two inputs are p-substitutes (0 < ∂2F
∂Ql∂Qh < +∞).2 Compared to the “M-P as-
sumption”, there are two main diﬀerences. First, the elasticity of substitution between
the two skills can take any positive value. The higher the elasticity of substitution,
the closer we are to the “standard model”.3 Second, the marginal value of labor now
varies with the number of workers in both sectors. Let pn denote the real price of the





The marginal value product of labor depends negatively on the number of workers
employed in the sector (since ∂pn/∂En < 0)4 and positively on the number of workers
employed in the other sector (∂pn/∂Em > 0,n = m).
1A similar assumption is made when technologies are not skill-speciﬁc (see Albrecht and Vroman,
2002).
2We also assume Inada conditions: lim
Qn→0
∂F




3The elasticityof substitution between skilled and unskilled labor lies between 1 and 2 (Cahuc and
Zylberberg, 2004, p. 211).
4A similar propertycould also be achieved with “large” ﬁrms and diminishing returns to labor.
However, we here avoid the complex intra-ﬁrm bargaining issues (see Stole and Zwiebel, 1996, and
Cahuc and Wasmer, 2001).
5The other assumptions are standard. Workers are able to direct their search. The
ﬂow of hires, Mn is a function of the number of vacancies, Vn and the number of job-
seekers measured in eﬃciency units, sn · Un, where sn designates the job-search eﬀort
of the Un unemployed. Ln denotes the size of the labor force. The matching function
is written Mn = m(sn · Un,V n). The function m(.,.) is assumed to be increasing,
concave and homogeneous of degree 1. Tightness is measured in eﬃciency units, namely
θn ≡ Vn/(snUn) or equivalently, after division by the exogenous and constant labor
force Ln, θn ≡ vn/(snun). The rate at which vacant jobs become ﬁlled is q(θn) ≡
Mn/Vn,q (θn) < 0. A job-seeker moves into employment according to a Poisson process
with rate sn · α(θn) ≡ sn · θn · q(θn), with α  (θn) > 0. Moreover, it is assumed that
lim
θn→0
q(θn)=+ ∞ and lim
θn→0
α(θn)=0 .
The model is developed in steady state and in continuous time. The equality be-
tween separations (occurring at an exogenous rate φn) and entries lead to an increasing
relationshipbetween emp loyment on the one hand, search and tightness on the other
En = E(θn,s n) ≡
sn α(θn)
φn + sn α(θn)
Ln (3)
Individuals have no access to capital markets. Let r be the discount rate common to all
agents. For a worker endowed with skill n, the discounted present value in employment,
VE,n veriﬁes :
rVE,n = wn + φn(VU,n − VE,n), (4)
where wn is the net wage in the nth intermediate sector (working time is normalized to
1) and VU,n represents the discounted expected lifetime income of an unemployed. We
assume that the instantaneous utility in unemployment is the sum of unemployment
beneﬁts (proportional to the net wages) and the imputed value of leisure, zn,5 net of the
cost of job-search d(sn) (with d( 0 )=0 ,d  > 0 and d    > 0). Denoting the replacement
ratio by ρn, VU,n veriﬁes the following Bellman equation:
rVU,n = max
sn
{ρn wn + zn − d(sn)+sn α(θn)(VE,n − VU,n)}. (5)
In a very standard way, at each point in time, the unemployed chooses the best level
of job-search taking tightness and the net intertemporal gain as given. The ﬁrst-order
(and suﬃcient) condition balances the marginal cost of search and the corresponding
marginal gain:
d
 (sn)=α(θn)(VE,n − VU,n) (6)
5This should be understood as the monetaryvalue of activities taking place during working hours,
that an unemployed has to give up when (s)he moves to employment. The importance of these depends
on institutional features of unemployment insurance. It should also be noticed that the nonmonetary
eﬀects of unemployment are not taken into account.
6Let ΠE,n denote the ﬁrm’s discounted expected return from an occupied job if the
ﬁrm produces the nth intermediate good (and recruits workers endowed with skill n).
For simplicity, taxation is linear. Let an +τn wn be the amount of taxes paid if the net
wage is wn (τn ≥ 0). According to its sign, an is an employer tax or subsidy. It does
not matter which side of the market pays or receives an. So, the latter can also be
interpreted as a lump-sum in-work tax or subsidy. Each ﬁlled vacancy yields yn units
of output times the price pn of the intermediate good. At an exogenous rate φn the
job is destroyed and its value becomes nil. The discounted expected return of a vacant
job in sector n is denoted by ΠV,n. Let kn be the ﬂow cost of posting a vacancy. The
discounted expected returns satisfy the following conditions:
rΠE,n = pn · yn − an − (1 + τn)wn + φn (−ΠE,n), (7)
rΠV,n = −kn + q(θn)(Π E,n − ΠV,n). (8)
There is free entry of vacancies. In equilibrium, ΠV,n then equals 0 in each sector.
From (7) and (8), the demand side of the market can be summarized by the following
“vacancy-supply curve” relating the wage and tightness on the labor market for skill
n:
wn = VS n(θn) ≡
pn yn − an − (r + φn)(kn/q(θn))
1+τn
,V S n
  < 0 (9)
Higher tax parameters (an or τn) shift the VS n curve downward.
When a worker and an employer form a match, the surplus VE,n − VU,n +Π E,n is
shared through bargaining. As usual in this literature, we assume a Nash bargain. If
βn denotes the exogenous bargaining power of the type-nworker (0 <β n < 1), the
solution to the game can be written as
VE,n − VU,n = βn(VE,n − VU,n +Π E,n) (10)
This property, the Bellman equations (4) and (5) and the free-entry condition (ΠE,n =
k/q(θn)) lead then to the following “wage-setting curve”:















  > 0,
(11)
A rise in τn shifts the WS n curve downwards. However, the eﬀect is less than propor-
tional since the instantaneous income in unemployment contains an untaxed component
zn − d(sn) which in general is neither zero nor inversely proportional to 1 + τn.








7This deﬁnes an implicit increasing relationship between sn and θn. Conditional on
tightness, a rise in the tax rate τn lowers the equilibrium return of search and hence
search eﬀort. From (12), it is obvious that a marginal change in job-search eﬀort does
not shift the wage-setting curve.
The relationship VS n − WS n = 0 can be written as:
Gn ≡ (1 − ρn)(1 − βn){pn yn − an}−(1 − (1 − βn)ρn)
(r + φn)kn
q(θn)
−βn sn kn θn − (1 − βn)(1 + τn)(zn − d(sn)) = 0 (13)
in which pn is a function of both employment levels and hence a function of tightness
and search eﬀort in both sectors. If the price of the intermediate good pn remained
constant, Gn = 0 would be an implicit function of θn only. Here, Gn is a function of
tightness in both sectors. Taking the implicit relationship (12) between search eﬀort
and tightness into account, diﬀerentiating Gn yields:
∂Gn
∂θn
= An + Bn < 0 (14)
∂Gn
∂θm
= Cn,m > 0 (15)
in which
An =( 1 − (1 − βn)ρn)
(r + φn)kn
q(θn)2 q
 (θn) − βn sn kn < 0, (16)




























In these expressions, An < 0 is the eﬀect found in the standard matching model. A
higher tightness raises the exit rate out of unemployment (pushing bargained wages
upwards) and increases the expected duration needed to ﬁll a vacancy (reducing the
wage that ﬁrms can aﬀord under free entry). Bn is a new negative term that captures
the eﬀects of a higher tightness in sector n on employment in this sector and hence on
the price of the corresponding intermediate good.6 As the labor market becomes more
tight, employment increases. In addition, a higher job ﬁnding rate raises search eﬀort
6The partial derivative of the price ∂pn/∂ynEn is computed from (2) and is negative. ∂En/∂θn
and ∂En/∂sn are computed from (3) and are positive. Finally, ∂sn/∂θn is computed from (12) and is
positive, too.
8which in turn raises employment. These combined positive eﬀects on employment lower
the marginal product of the corresponding intermediate good in the production of the
ﬁnal good. Hence, the equilibrium price pn shrinks and this depresses the creation of
vacancies. Finally, Cn,m captures a positive cross eﬀect.7 Increasing tightness in sector
m raises employment in this sector. As the two intermediate goods are substitutes,
the marginal product of the other intermediate good increases and this eventually
stimulates the opening of vacancies in the other sector (n).
In steady-state, the equilibrium pair(s) (θl,θ h) verify the system of equations Gl =
Gh = 0. Each of these equalities deﬁne an increasing implicit relationship between
θl and θh. It is therefore far from obvious that an equilibrium exists and is unique.
Cardullo (2005) shows this property. Figure 1 illustrates the equilibrium. Knowing
the levels of tightness, the values of net wages and of employment follow immediately
respectively from (11) and (3).
We now look at the eﬀects on tightness levels of changes in the lump-sum employ-
ment tax/subsidy, an, and in the tax rate, τn. We only consider the case n = l. The
comparative static analysis starts from a unique equilibrium (θl,θ h). Under the M-P
assumption, the price of the intermediate goods is assumed to be ﬁxed. We compare
the changes in tightness levels in this setting with those coming out when these prices
are endogenous.
Eﬀects of the lump-sum employment tax/subsidy
Consider a marginal change in al. Under the M-P assumption, the real price of the

















Taking the endogeneity of prices into account, one gets after some manipulation:
dθl
dal




(1 − ρl)(1 − βl)Ch,l
(Al + Bl)(Ah + Bh) − Cl,h Ch,l
< 0, (22)
7The expressions used to compute the various partial derivatives are explained in the previous
footnote.
9where, exploiting Euler’s formula for linear homogeneous function,8 one has:
µl =
Al(Ah + Bh)
(Al + Bl)(Ah + Bh) − Cl,h Ch,l
=
Al(Ah + Bh)
Al(Ah + Bh)+Bl Ah
< 1.
Figure 1 illustrates these eﬀects (see the interrupted line). So, compared to the case
where the real prices of the two intermediate goods are taken as constant, dθl/dal is less
negative. Two opposite eﬀects are present. First, if the employment tax is augmented
in a given sector, say l, there is at given prices pn a reduction in tightness and hence
in employment in this sector. Less employment implies a rise in the marginal product
of workers and this leads to a higher price for the corresponding intermediate good Ql.
More vacancies are therefore posted. This attenuates the initial drop in employment.
Second, less employment in sector l, where the employment tax is augmented, implies a
lower marginal product of the other intermediate good Qh. Less vacancies are therefore
created in sector h. And this in turn depress job creation in sector l. One easily see
that this chain of eﬀects creates a multiplicative eﬀect which tends to amplify the initial
decline in tightness θl. Since 0 <µ l < 1, the ﬁrst eﬀect dominates.
This discussion implies that an employment subsidy in the low-skill sector will rise
tightness (and hence employment) in this sector less than under the M-P assumption.
The induced eﬀect of the employment subsidy is moreover positive in the skilled sector
(while it is zero under the M-P assumption). The quantitative importance of these
diﬀerences will be studied in Section 5.
It should also be noticed that contrary to the standard M-P model (in which
marginal variations in search eﬀort do not aﬀect tightness in equilibrium), endogeneiz-
ing search eﬀort matters here. For, marginal changes in search eﬀort aﬀect the level
of employment (see (3)) and hence the prices of the intermediate goods. The equilib-
rium levels of tightness are therefore eventually modiﬁed. Consequently, endogeneizing
search eﬀort changes the impacts of the tax paramerters an and τn in our model.
Eﬀects of the tax rate
Consider a marginal change in the tax parameter τl. Totally diﬀerentiating Gl =
Gh = 0 with respect to θl,θ h and τl, it can be veriﬁed that the sign of the variation













− (zn − d(sl))
 
, (23)
in which ∂sl/∂τl is computed from (12) and is negative. Two mechanisms are at work













10and hence employment in Sector l. This raises the equilibrium price for the intermediate
good sold by this sector. So, the ﬁrst product between brackets in (23) is nonnegative.
According to this ﬁrst eﬀect, a higher tax rate raises equilibrium tightness in both
sectors. The second mechanism which is not new (see Holmlund, 2001) is due to the
existence of untaxed activities. Raising taxes aﬀects the level of bargained wages (see
(11)). With constant replacement ratios, the change in unemployment beneﬁts is by
deﬁnition proportional. However, the net income of the unemployed is also inﬂuenced
by two components that are not inﬂuenced by the tax rate, namely zn and d(sn).
This introduces a form of real wage rigidity. Therefore, bargained wages do not fully
adjust when the tax rate rises. Hence, tightness is aﬀected by proportional taxation.
If zl − d(sl) > 0 (respectively, < 0), according to this second mechanism only, a
rise in τl would reduce (respectively, increase) equilibrium tightness θl. This is the
conclusion under the M-P assumption. In our more ﬂexible framework, because of the
ﬁrst mechanism, the marginal eﬀect dθl/dτl has an ambiguous sign if zl − d(sl) > 0.
2.2 Generalizing the model to encompass other LMPs
Employment subsidies do not take place in isolation. They are typically introduced in
labor markets where so-called active and passive LMPs are also present. We now show
how the framework of the previous subsection can be further extended to evaluate the
interactions between these policies in a general equilibrium setting. Some hypotheses
will be chosen with Continental Europe in mind.
In accordance with institutions in many OECD countries, a two-tiered beneﬁt sys-
tem is assumed to prevail. An insured unemployed whose ‘high’ beneﬁts has expired
enters a state where (s)he indeﬁnitely can beneﬁt from a lower unemployment beneﬁt.
The latter could be an assistance beneﬁt. High beneﬁts expire at an exogenous rate
πn > 0. For jobless individuals, three states are identiﬁed: Insured unemployment
with high beneﬁts (Un), insured unemployment with low beneﬁts (Xn) and partici-
pation (Tn) in a short-duration active labor market policy (ALMP) organized by the
Public Employment Services (PES). We have in mind counseling programs, job clubs
or very brief training schemes. By assumption, these policies do not change the pro-
ductivity of the participants.9 These upper-case symbols will designate both the states
and the number of individuals occupying them in steady state. The corresponding in-
tertemporal discounted values will be denoted by VU,n, VX,n and VT,n. Figure 2 displays
the various states and the ﬂows in this economy. A growing literature shows that dura-
9Assuming a ﬁxed distribution of skills and skill-speciﬁc matching, it should be stressed that this
paper does not deal with (long-duration training) schemes that intend to enhance skills (see Albrecht,
van den Berg and Vroman, 2004, and Boone and van Ours, 2004) or to enlarge the set of occupations
that are accessible (see Masters, 2000).
11tion dependence is largely spurious in Continental Europe (see Machin and Manning,
1999). True duration dependence is therefore assumed to be a negligible phenomenon
in this economy.
Let sU,n,s X,n and sT,n denote search intensities in the various states. A unique
exogenous matching eﬀectiveness parameter cn will be associated to states Un and
Xn. For ALMP participants, this parameter can be diﬀerent and will be denoted
cT,n. It is assumed that cT,n >c n > 0.10 So, in the matching function m(Sn,V n),
Sn ≡ cn (sU,n Un + sX,n Xn)+cT,n sT,n Tn and tightness is deﬁned as θn ≡ Vn/Sn.
The unemployed receive an oﬀer to take part to the ALMP at an exogenous rate
γn ≥ 0.11 The unemployed have then to decide whether they enter the program (right
away) or not. Two cases will be distinguished. First, this oﬀer is not used to verify the
availability of the unemployed. Then, the intertemporal value of those who receive an
oﬀer in state Un is V U,n = max(VT,n;VU,n). In state Xn,i ti sV X,n = max(VT,n;VX,n).
Second, this oﬀer is on the contrary used as a way of monitoring the unemployed.
Someone in state Un can be sanctioned if (s)he refuses to take part to the program.
Let the sanction be an immediate entry in state Xn. Then, V U,n = max(VT,n;VX,n). It
is assumed that those in state Xn cannot be sanctioned by entering a lower position
than Xn, which then plays the role of a minimum income guarantee. In addition,
participation to the ALMP can be unsuccessful in some case. More precisely, it is
assumed that the program fails at an exogenous rate λn ≥ 0.
In steady state, the stocks of individuals in each position (Un, Xn,...) are constant.
Equalities between entries and exits in each state determine the level of employment
En among workers endowed with skill n. En increases with tightness θn and search
eﬀort levels Sn ≡ (sU,n,s X,n,s T,n) (for details, see Appendix B).
If the wage negotiation took place at the individual level, the wage would be diﬀerent
according to the state of origin, at least just after entry into the ﬁrm. Having Continen-
tal Europe in mind, we assume instead that the wage in sector n is bargained over by
incumbent employees on behalf of all workers of this sector. The fall-back position of
these “insiders” is the intertemporal discounted utility of an unemployed entering state
Un, denoted by VU,n. Then, there is a single skill-speciﬁc wage. The discounted value
10The ALMP can intrinsicallyimprove the eﬀectiveness of search eﬀort. Other explanations can be
suggested, too. As job-entryrates are often used in the assessment of labor programs, the PES can for
instance give priorityto participants to these programs, in particular in the case of a closed treatment
of job oﬀers. This refers to the case where the PES select those who are suitable for vacancies in their
register.
11Conditioning the access to an ALMP on the level of unemployment beneﬁts would be considered
as discriminatory. So, this possibility is ruled out here. As it is observed in several countries, partici-
pation to active programs is a suﬃcient condition to become eligible to high beneﬁts again. Relaxing
this assumption would substantiallycomplicate the mathematical expressions used below and in the
appendices without adding much insight.
12of holding a job still veriﬁes (4). We keepthe hyp othesis of constant rep lacement ratios
and assume the following very plausible ranking: 1 >ρ T,n ≥ ρU,n >ρ X,n > 0. Let
vι,n ≡ ρι,n · wι,n + zn − d(sι,n))ι ∈{ U,X,T}. We impose that vι,n, with ι ∈{ U,X,T},
is always positive. For jobless people endowed with skill n, the intertemporal utility
levels solve the following Bellman equations:
rVU,n = max
sU,n




{vX,n + cn sX,n α(θn)(VE,n − VX,n)+γn(V X,n − VX,n)}, (25)
rVT,n = max
sT,n
{vT,n + cT,n sT,n α(θn)(VE,n − VT,n)+λn(VU,n − VT,n)}. (26)
Under the assumptions made so far, Appendices A and B show that the intertemporal
values can always be ranked (VE,n >V T,n >V U,n >V X,n) under an additional suﬃcient
condition, namely λn >φ n.12 Consequently, all the unemployed choose to take part
to the program and V U,n = V X,n = VT,n. The optimal levels of search eﬀort Sn
solve ﬁrst-order conditions that are similar to (6). They are stated in Appendix B.
They imply that sX,n >s U,n because the unemployed in the second tier gain more
from searching (VE,n − VX,n >V E,n − VU,n). On the contrary, sT,n and sU,n cannot be
ranked. The treated are induced to search harder because search eﬀort is more eﬃcient
(cT,n >c n). However, when search is successful, the net gain is lower for the treated:
VE,n − VT,n <V E,n − VU,n.
Job creation is modelled in the same way as in Section 2.1. Thus, the vacancy-supply
curve (9) remains unchanged. Since the expression relating VU,n to the endogenous vari-
ables and the parameters is much more complex than in Section 2.1, the “wage-setting
curve” is more involved, too (see (48) in Appendix B). However, the properties found
earlier remain. The net wage wn is an increasing function of tightness θn. Marginal
changes in job-search eﬀort do not shift the wage-setting curve. The equations that
characterize search eﬀort levels in equilibrium are much more complex than (12). They
are stated in Appendix B. It remains true that search eﬀort increases with tightness
and decreases with the tax rate τn.
Eliminating the net wage from the wage-setting and the vacancy-supply curves
yields a system of equations Gl = Gh = 0. As in Section 2.1, each of these equalities
deﬁne an increasing implicit relationship between θl and θh and the equilibrium is
unique. It can easily be seen that the employment tax-subsidy an and the tax rate τn
12In Continental Europe, it is quite natural to assume that the expected length of an employment
spell (taking all types of contracts into account) is longer than the expected duration of the short-
duration ALMP. Consequently, 1/λn < 1/φn,∀n.
13play qualitatively the same role as in Section 2.1.13
The equilibrium eﬀects of the parameters characterizing the unemployment insur-
ance system and the ALMP have already been developed under the M-P assumption.14
Here, we brieﬂy summarize theses eﬀects and then explain how the comparative statics
changes in our more ﬂexible setting. Due to space limitation, we focus on two major
parameters only: πn and γn.
In a two-tiered unemployment beneﬁt scheme, Van der Linden (2003a) shows that a
marginal increase in the rate (πn) at which jobless workers ﬂow from the “high” to the
“low” beneﬁt level has a positive direct (i.e. conditional on θn) eﬀect on employment En
since sX,n >s U,n
15 and a positive impact on labor market tightness through a decline
in the fall-back position of workers. A more tight labor market also stimulates search
eﬀort. However, a marginal increase in πn has in addition a negative direct eﬀect on
search in the second tier and in the ALMP. This is due to an unfavorable “entitlement
eﬀect” (see Mortensen, 1977): The gain of a successful search activity also depends
on the utility if the new job is lost. This gain is negatively aﬀected by πn. Therefore,
the net eﬀect on En cannot be signed. These are the analytical conclusions under the
M-P assumption. In our more ﬂexible setting, not only the eﬀect of employment but
probably also the one on tightness are ambiguous in sector n. The above-mentioned
direct eﬀect and the entitlement eﬀect inﬂuence En in opposite ways. If the entitlement
eﬀect is dominated by the other one,16 the rise in employment lowers the price of the
intermediate good. So, the vacancy-supply curve wn = VS(θn) shifts downwards. This
move and the downward shift of the wage-setting curve explain why the net eﬀect on θn
is now ambiguous. In addition, the variation of En has an induced eﬀect on tightness
in the other sector. This mechanism has already been explained in Section 2.1. If the
entitlement eﬀect is dominated by the other one, a rise in πn would unambiguously
increase equilibrium tightness in the other sector.17 Recall that this cross-eﬀect does
not appear under the M-P assumption.
Van der Linden (2005) shows that a marginal rise in the rate of entry into the
ALMP, γn, has a direct positive eﬀect on employment conditional on tightness if, as we
assume for the rest of this section, the “matching eﬀectiveness” cT,n·sT,n is suﬃciently
13In some countries, like France, the wage of the low-skilled is not bargained over but equal to the
legal minimum wage. The latter is periodicallyadjusted upwards to keep relative wages approximately
constant. We have veriﬁed that the qualitative properties of the employment subsidy remain when
wh is negotiated and wl = aw h, where a is an exogenous parameter (0 <a<1).
14See Van der Linden (2003a), Van der Linden (2003b) and Van der Linden (2005).
15Intuitively, this creates a relative increase in the number of unemployed in the second tier where
search eﬀort is higher.







∂πn > 0. Although there is no formal proof, this sounds plausible
because the entitlement eﬀect is a delayed eﬀect if the worker returns in unemployment.
17The proof which makes use of Euler’s formula is available upon request.
14higher than cn · sX,n (see Appendix C). In the model, the matching eﬀectiveness of
those in the ﬁrst tier (Un) can be raised either by sending them into the active program
or by letting them enter the second tier (Xn). Independently of the induced eﬀects, the
active program cannot raise employment if the former channel is less eﬀective than the
latter (i.e. if cT,n · sT,n <c n · sX,n). As far as indirect eﬀects are concerned, increasing
the rate γn has a wage-push eﬀect (since VT,n >V U,n) and no eﬀect on the vacancy-
supply curve under the M-P assumption. So, equilibrium tightness θn declines. This
induces a negative adjustment in equilibrium search. Both counteract the direct eﬀect
on employment En. The rate γn has also a direct eﬀect on search eﬀort in states Xn
and Tn. It can be shown that the former is negative while the latter is positive.18 To
sum up, putting more jobless individuals in this ALMP has a clear-cut negative impact
on tightness but an unclear net eﬀect on employment.19
Now, in our more ﬂexible setting, not only the eﬀect of employment but also the
one on tightness are in general ambiguous because, under the M-P assumption, the net
eﬀect of γn on En is ambiguous (see Appendix C). However, if this eﬀect is nonnegative,
Appendix C shows that one net impact on tightness can be signed in our more ﬂexible
setting: dθl/dγl < 0 and dθh/dγh < 0.
3Taxes, subsidies and the low-skilled problem
Several countries (Belgium, France and Germany) with high tax wedges (measured as
the ratio between the wage cost and the net wage) on low-paid workers have recently
reduced the tax burden on the low-paid relative to the one of the highly-paid (see
Figures 3 and 4). In Belgium, the country considered from now on, Figure 4 shows a
slow downward tendency. This can be explained by the combination of two reforms.
First, reductions of social security contributions amounted to 0.5% of GDP in 1998
and 1.2% in 2004. These reductions vary with the wage. Figure 5 shows that the total
rate of social security contributions is substantially reduced on low-wage workers (in
the private sector). The highest reduction is at the legal minimum wage (about 1050
Euro/month at the age of 18). The phased-out region is spread over a wide interval of
gross wages (from the minimum wage to about 2000 Euros/month). About 28% of men
and 55% of women are currently employed in the phased-out region. The phased-out
region contains most of the minimum wages bargained at the sectoral level. Above
2000 Euros/month, reductions of social security contributions are ﬁrst completely ﬂat
and they increase again above a monthly wage of about 4000 Euros.
Second, a tax reform has been introduced in Belgium in 2001. Despite a small
18For an explanation, see Appendix B.
19The same kind of reasoning holds in case of a decline in the failure rate, λn.
15individualized income tax credit at the bottom of the income distribution, the “eﬀects
of the reform in terms of increase in disposable income appear to be strongest for the
middle to upper class ” (Orsini, 2005, p. 42).
So, in recent years, Belgian authorities have used two instruments to reduce the tax
wedge on the labor income of almost all types of workers with only a limited emphasis
on low-wages. Figure 4 illustrates this conclusion. Other countries like France appear
to have implemented a clearer strategy.
Long-term unemployment is a major problem in Belgium. During the last thirty
years or so, more than 50% of the stock has typically been unemployed for more than
a year. The median duration in the stock amounts to about 2 years. In Belgium,
negative duration dependence is very strong but Cockx and Dejemeppe (2005) have
shown that it is largely spurious in the South. On data covering the period 1995 -
2004, Heylen and Bollens (2005) ﬁnd positive duration dependence for men (nearly
no dependence for women) in the North of the country. Their result for men is in
accordance with our theoretical model. The level of skill (understood as education) is
one of the key individual characteristics that aﬀect the hiring rate. In each region of
the country and for each gender, the unemployment rate of the less-educated (at most
a lower-secondary degree) is for many years two to four times higher than the one of
those with post-secondary education.
The following simulation exercise will quantify the eﬀects of reductions in the wedge
and see to what extent these eﬀects are sensitive to the choice of the eligible population.
Moreover, we will measure to what extent they are sensitive to the design of other
LMPs.
4 Calibration, validation and extensions
We take the month as unit of time. Data refer to the 1997-1998 period where the
stocks were fairly stable in Belgium. It should be stressed at the outset that we do
not have access to individual data about (non-)participants to LMPs nor to a pilot-
study. Due to statistical availability, only two levels of skill are distinguished. The
low-skill population is assumed to hold at most a lower-secondary degree. The low-
skilled represent 34% of the active population, 30% of salaried employment and 64% of
the stock of unemployed. Table 1 presents the calibrated values and the rates of people
in the various states. The low-skilled total unemployment rate is about 20% against
6.5% for the skilled workers. e designates the ratio between salaried employment and
the active population. p is the participation rate. Both are much lower for the low-
skilled.
To calibrate the model, we ﬁrst exploit relationships derived from the model (equi-
16librium of ﬂows in steady-state, the wage-setting curves, the optimality conditions).
We also make use of various surveys20, published statistics21, other statistics collected
for the purpose of this study, and results found in the literature. A sensitivity analysis
is conducted on some parameters.
We take ah = al = 0. Data on wage costs and net wages are used to ﬁx the tax rate
(including social security contributions) τn. In accordance with the evidence shown in
Section 3, these are high (τl =1 ,τ h =1 .17). Administrative data indicate that less
than 2.5% of the unemployed do not receive unemployment beneﬁts (UBs) in Belgium.
Neglecting this phenomenon, there is ﬁrst a period of one year where UBs stay constant.
With the month as unit of time, πn is therefore equal to 0.083. For about two-third
of the insured unemployed, the level of beneﬁts decreases afterwards. In 1998, less
than 2% of the unemployed have lost their entitlement to (after a very long spell of
unemployment). This phenomenon is therefore neglected, too. The time-proﬁle of
skill-speciﬁc UBs is an average computed from administrative data. The replacement
ratios are displayed in Table 1. At the end of the nineties, many beneﬁciaries of active
programs participated (often simultaneously) to a combination of three interventions:22
Individual advice and guidance23, job-search assistance (such as job clubs, tips on
ﬁnding jobs and writing a successful resume) and short-duration vocational training24.
Due to constraints on data, those policies are taken as an aggregate and henceforth
called ‘counseling programs’.
As many other papers, let us assume the following Cobb-Douglas matching function
(see Petrongolo and Pissarides, 2001): m(Sn,V n) ≡ m0S0.5
n V 0.5
n . Parameter m0 is a
scaling factor for the various cι’s and for kn.25 The discount rate is ﬁxed at 0.004 (5%
on an annual basis). Annual reports of the PES allow to ﬁx parameters φn, λn and γn
(see Table 1).
The expected duration of a vacancy (2.5 month) and the share of the low-skilled
in the total number of recruitments (0.38) is used to calibrate the θ’s. The aggregate
production function is a C.E.S. Due to a lack of appropriate time-series for Belgium,
20Simoens, Denys and Denolf (1998), Denolf, Denys and Simoens (1999) and Delmotte, Van
Hootegem and Dejonckheere (2001).
21Published bynational and regional PES in Belgium and byEurostat (2002a) and Eurostat (2002b).
22See Vos, Struyven and Bollens (2000).
23“Plan d’accompagnement des chˆ omeurs” i.e. a small number of meetings with a member of the
PES during a period of four months.
24According to annual reports of the regional PES, there exist veryshort programs mixing counseling
and short-lived training that lasted about 100 hours on average.
25Assuming that m0 =0 .5 yields reasonable values. A sensitivity analysis has been conducted. We
consider an alternative matching function, inspired bythe results of Cockx and Dejemeppe (2002),
namely m0S0.4
n V 0.6
n . Unreported simulation results show that the eﬀects of changes in the tax wedge
are similar.
17we use a French study (Biscourpand Gianella, 2001) to ﬁx the elasticity of substitution
to 1.1. The “vacancy-supply curves” (9) are then used to calibrate the k’s. kn also
aﬀects the wage-setting curve and hence the calibrated value of the bargaining power.
The marginal products pn · yn are chosen so as to produce sensible values for the ratio
of the share of the wage bill in output.
We assume an iso-elastic cost of job-search d(s)=ψn·sξn/ξn, with ψn > 0 and ξn >
1. In the absence of relevant information, we impose zn = 0. The products cιsι,ι=
{T,n},{X,n},{U,n},n∈{ l,h} can be computed from the ﬂow equilibrium conditions.
Conditional on these products, the calibration then ﬁxes the cι’s, the sι’s, ξn, and the
bargaining power of the workers βn. This part of the calibration is based on Equations
(48), (49), (50) and (51) in Appendix A. This system is solved conditional on the
assumption ψl = ψh =7 .4. Raising this parameter induces a proportional increase in
cT,n and cn and a proportional reduction in all search-eﬀort levels without aﬀecting
the other parameters. From Table 1, an increase in γn has a direct positive eﬀect on
employment. Skilled workers search more intensively. As expected, they have higher
matching eﬀectiveness parameters.
The bargaining power of the skilled workers veriﬁes the Hosios condition, i.e. their
level of unemployment would be eﬃcient in an economy without taxes, transfers and
subsidies.26 Under the same assumptions, the calibrated bargaining power would lead
to an ineﬃciently high level of unemployment for the low-skilled. One can wonder why
βl is somewhat higher than βh in Table 1. Union density is not the unique determinant
of the bargaining power. Nevertheless, part of diﬀerence between the β’s can be related
to diﬀerences in union density. The latter is more important among blue-collar workers
than among white-collar ones. In addition, Belgian unions have a strong distaste for
inequality.
To check the validity of this calibration, we ﬁrst look at two properties of the model
that were not used during the calibration and about which some data are available.
Then, we compute two major elasticities and compare them to standard values found in
the literature. In 1997, the average stock of vacancies registered by the PES amounted
to 24,500. With a market share of the PES in the range [0.4,0.5], the calibrated
stock of vacancies (53,000) is an acceptable order of magnitude. With the calibrated
parameters, the expected duration of an unemployment spell amounts to 11 months
for the skilled and 31 months for the low-skilled. Weighted by the share of each skill in
the inﬂow into unemployment, the mean duration would then be equal to 19 months,
a result that is in line with the computations of Dejemeppe (2005).27
26Cardullo (2005) shows that the Hosios condition guarantees eﬃciencyin the setting of Section
2.1.
27From her analysis of unemployment dynamics in Belgium, the average unemployment duration in
1992 was equal to 2 years in the South of Belgium and to 1.5 years in the North.
18The computed wage elasticity of salaried employment (job-search eﬀort remaining
ﬁxed) amounts to low but reasonable values, namely - 0.54 for low-skilled workers and
- 0.33 for skilled ones. The estimations of the elasticity of substitution being rather
dispersed, we also consider later an elasticity of 2 instead of 1.1. After a new calibration,
the two elasticities of labor demand become respectively equal to - 0.65 and - 0.34.
Finally, the elasticity of unemployment duration with respect to the level of UBs
(tightness remaining ﬁxed) is equal to 0.39 for the high-skilled and 0.26 for the low-
skilled. The latter elasticities are relatively low but they remain acceptable (according
to Meyer (2002), an elasticity of 0.5 is a standard order of magnitude).
The model of Section 2.2 is in addition extended to deal with the extensive margin
(participation decisions). Furthermore, the government budget constraint is added
to close the model. Participation is modeled in a very simple way (see Pissarides,
2000). Inactive people have an arbitrage condition: Staying inactive or entering state
Xn.28 Let Pn be the exogenous size of the working age population (P≡
 
n Pn). Let
[V1,n,V 2,n] be the ﬁnite support of the distribution of intertemporal utility levels in









Following Immervoll, Kleven, ThurstupKreiner and Saez (2004), the elasticity of the
participation rate pn with respect to wn is ﬁxed to 0.4 for the low-skilled and 0.2 for
the high-skilled. These assumptions and the participation rates allow to calibrate the
boundaries V1,n and V2,n introduced in (27). Let lower case letters en,u n,x n,t n and vn
be the rates obtained by dividing the absolute numbers by Ln (e.g. en ≡ En
Ln). The
budget of the State scaled by P can be written as follows:
 
n
(ρU,nun + ρX,nxn +( ρT,n + C)tn)pn Pn =
 
n
(an + τn wn)en pn Pn, (28)
where C is the average cost of the program.29 When the budget constraint is binding
in the simulation exercises, both tax rates τn are adjusted proportionally to fulﬁll (28).
28Alternatively, they could enter uninsured unemployment (i.e. start an unemployment spell without
anybeneﬁt). However, in Belgium, people who are readyto take a job and have no income are eligible
to a minimum income guarantee. The latter is in a wayor another related to the lowest level of UBs,
ρX,n · wn. So, the simplifying assumption made here is not a substantial limitation.
29Data in Eurostat (2002a, 2002b) allow to estimate that the average cost C of these programs
amounted to 130 Euro per worker and per month (net of transfers to beneﬁciaries of these programs).
To Equation (28) we also add an exogenous level Q of net public expenses that solves this equation
for the calibrated values of the parameters and of the endogenous variables. This level is kept ﬁxed
during simulations.
195 Simulation results
In this section, we illustrate by how much the eﬀects of an employment subsidy on
the low-skilled, al, change when the M-P assumption is replaced by our more ﬂexible
setting. Then, we look for the optimal level employment subsidy. Finally, we consider
the interactions between an employment subsidy and other LMPs.
Table 2 considers an employment subsidy al = −300 Euro/month, i.e. 12% of the
calibrated wage cost. Comparing the case where the marginal values of labor are ﬁxed
(the M-P assumption) to the one where they vary lead to relatively small diﬀerences
in tightness but large ones in search eﬀort. Assuming ﬁxed marginal values of labor
leads to overestimate the level of employment El by about 5% and to underestimate
Eh by 0.7% (see the two ﬁrst lines of Table 2). Taking into account the diﬀerences
in terms of the net wages, the over- and underestimations are more substantial in the
case of intertemporal discounted values. As expected, the diﬀerences shrink when the
elasticity of substitution, σ, increases (compare the two last lines of Table 2 with the
two ﬁrst ones). The magnitude of the over- and underestimations vary with the size of
the employment subsidy. According to the indicator, doubling the level of al multiplies
the diﬀerences provided in Table 2 by 1.4 to 1.8.
Next, we look for the optimal employment subsidy taking the other parameters of
the model unchanged. This task can be divided in two steps. First, the choice of the
eligible population. Second, conditional on this choice, the level of the employment sub-
sidy an. All simulations made lead to one ﬁrst conclusion: Targeting the employment
subsidy on the low-skilled is the best thing to do. To illustrate this assertion, con-
sider the following comparison. An employment subsidy scheme (al = −300,a h =0 )
Euro/month is compared to a scheme that has the same cost ex ante (wages and em-
ployment being ﬁxed) and a structure similar to current practices in Belgium, namely
(al = −110,a h = −81). Taking the budget constraint (28) into account, the ﬁrst
scheme creates two times more employment than the second one. The intertemporal
discounted income levels of all groups are also higher in the case of the ﬁrst scheme.30
So, from now on, we put ah to zero and focus on al only.
With risk-neutral agents and in the absence of a concern for redistribution, we




−r(˜ t−t)W(˜ t)d˜ t, (29)
30It is not obvious that even the high skilled prefer the ﬁrst scheme to the second one. For, the
latter would a priori raise their bargained wage and their employment rate more than the ﬁrst scheme.
However, the lower global eﬀect of the second scheme on (un)employment leads to higher tax rates
τn,∀n ∈{ l,h}. And this eﬀect turns out to outweigh the others.
20where W(˜ t) is the sum of the instantaneous utility of the individuals (weighted by
their numbers) and of proﬁts made by the ﬁnal and the intermediate ﬁrms. When the
policies are ﬁnanced (i.e. (28) is fulﬁlled) and if the discount rate tends to zero, this
benevolent planner actually maximizes net output in steady state:
F(El yl,E h yh) −
 
n




Expression (30) scaled by the size of the population is denoted by Y in Figure 6.31 Y
reaches a maximum when al is close to - 1490 Euro/month. We also computed net
output assuming ﬁxed marginal values of labor and found a maximum for al close to
-2430 Euro/month. So, the normative conclusion appears to be very diﬀerent whether
marginal values of labor are assumed to be ﬁxed or not.
The optimal employment subsidy looks extremely large compared to the calibrated
value of the net wage (1229 Euro/month). Through bargaining, the employment sub-
sidy is to some extent appropriated by the low-skilled workers. When al = −1490, the
net monthly wage amounts to 1677 Euro (+36%). Thanks to a cut in unemployment
(the low-skilled unemployment rate is halved), the rise in the tax rate needed to ﬁnance
the subsidy (11%) is not huge. Altogether, the optimal low-skilled wage cost is equal
to 2053 Euro (16% lower than the calibrated wage cost, 2258 Euro). The optimal total
amount of taxes paid on low-skilled work equals 376 Euro (i.e. 70% lower than without
the employment subsidy). By comparison with current policies, consider a low-skilled
single person without children. The corresponding average total amount of taxes is
about 850 Euro/month in 2005. In the case of a couple with two children and a single
(low-skilled) wage, the average total amount of taxes is about 620 Euro/month in 2005.
This comparison suggests that the gap between current and optimal levels of taxes on
low-skilled workers is still large.
Adopting a political economy perspective, it is however doubtful that the optimal
value of al would be implemented. For, the skilled workers, who represent two-third of
the active population, ﬁrst beneﬁt from the employment subsidy but start losing below
al ≈− 600 Euro (See Figure 6). The relationshipbetween the tax rates τn and al is
U-shaped.32 For suﬃciently small values of al, the employment subsidy is so eﬀective
that the tax rates τn can be slightly reduced. Above an employment subsidy ≈ 370
Euro/month, the tax rates τn start rising. So, on the one hand there is the favorable
eﬀects of al on tightness θh explained in Section 2.1 and on the other the rise in the tax
rate τh eventually reduces the net wage and the employment level of the high-skilled.
Their intertemporal discounted income starts shrinking, too. This conclusion could be
31Since our calibration uses a discount rate of 0.004, a fullyrigorous analy sis would require to look
also at the adjustment path towards the steady-state values.
32As both tax rates τn follow the same evolution, only τl is displayed on the ﬁgure.
21sensitive to the way of ﬁnancing the employment subsidy. However, we leave this issue
for further research.
The previous simulation exercise illustrates that “countries can engineer a reduction
of unemployment without a sacriﬁce of low-end pay and a rise in low-end pay without
a sacriﬁce of employment” (Phelps , 2003, p. 11). We now consider interactions
between ﬁscal instruments and other LMPs and raise the question: Could reforms to
LMPs improve the eﬀectiveness of employment subsidies? We have seen in Section
3 that the tax wedge is relatively high in Belgium. Public expenditures on LMPs
represented 3.75% of GDP in Belgium in 2003. Is it possible to engineer reforms
to LMPs that reduce public expenditures but reinforce the eﬀects of an employment
subsidy and are welfare improving (at least in steady state)? To answer that question,
we consider a reform that induces steeper time-proﬁle of UBs (a rise in parameter
πn) and another that lowers the rate γn of entry into the active program. Below, we
consider an employment subsidy of al = −300 Euro/month. According to Figure 6,
such a subsidy improves the intertemporal utility of all individuals. Moreover, with
al = −300, the ex ante cost of the subsidy equals 1% of GDP, i.e. the total amount of
reductions in employers’ payroll taxes in Belgium in 2003. Given the huge public debt
of this country, keeping total (ex ante) expenses constant looks reasonable.
At given tax levels, Section 2.2 indicated that a rise in πn would have a clear-cut
negative eﬀect on net wages and ambiguous eﬀects on tightness and employment. If
this reform allows to reduce the tax wedge, the eﬀect on the wage could however be
reversed. This is illustrated by the following simulation. Let us compare the calibrated
value, πn =1 /12, to πn =1 /3, ∀n ∈{ l,h}. This reform divides the expected duration
of “high” beneﬁts by four. When al = −300, total net output, Y , is 2% higher with
the reform: 2137 Euro instead of 2095. The tax rates τn can be reduced (for instance,
τh equals 1.07 after the reform versus 1.13).33 Without this tax reduction, the low-
skilled, whatever their current position, would be worse-oﬀ after the reform, while the
high-skilled would be better-oﬀ. Table 3 shows that the reform becomes a steady-state
Pareto improvement when tax rates are adjusted (downwards) to fulﬁll the budget
constraint (28). Unreported simulations results show that this conclusion is robust to
changes in the discount rate. To check this, we considered an annual discount rate of
20% (instead of 5%), we calibrated the model again and then simulated it. Remember
however that the model assumes risk neutrality.34
33Bythe way , since the tax wage τh = 1.17 when al = 0, there is a kind of Laﬀer eﬀect: the eﬃciency
of the employ ment subsidyleads to tax cuts. Recall however that we onlyfocus on steady -state eﬀects.
34The same kind of reform of the proﬁle of UBs is analyzed under risk aversion by Fredriksson and
Holmlund (2001), Fredriksson and Holmlund (2003), Heer (2003), Van der Linden (2003b) and Coles
and Masters (2006).
22Van der Linden (2005) studies the aﬀect of an active program that enhances match-
ing eﬀectiveness. In a framework where the marginal values of labor are ﬁxed, his sim-
ulation exercise for Belgium leads to mixed conclusions. When taxation is kept ﬁxed,
(un)employment deteriorates with γl while the low-skilled intertemporal indicators of
welfare are improving. This conﬂict still holds when the ﬁnancing of the program is
taken into account. In addition, since the tax rate of both skill groups has to adjust
to ﬁnance the active program, the welfare of the high-skilled is negatively aﬀected by
a rise in the size of the program. Given these results, we here assume that this ac-
tive program is abandoned and see how an employment subsidy performs in that case.
When al = −300, net output is larger (2131 Euro versus 2095 with the active program).
The tax rate is reduced (τh =1 .08 instead of 1.13)). Table 4 indicates that again net
wages, employment and utility levels can simultaneously increase if the active program
analyzed here disappears when the employment subsidy is introduced.
These simulation exercises have illustrated the existence of reforms to LMPs that
at the same time reduce public expenditures and improve the eﬀects of an employment
subsidy.
6 Conclusion
This paper has shown that the equilibrium search-matching model can be enriched to
become an instrument of evaluation of policies targeted on speciﬁc groups. Instead
of assuming a juxtaposition of labor markets, we have modelled interactions between
them. The marginal value of labor then varies with the number of workers in all sectors.
This paper shows that the model remains tractable. Several analytical conclusions can
still be derived. For policy evaluations, the model has afterwards been extended to
deal with institutional features and various labor market policies.
Using this framework, computational experiments have shown that employment
subsidies targeted on low-skilled workers perform well. At least in countries with large
tax wedges, they can simultaneously raise employment, wages and intertemporal in-
come of all groups. This conclusion is in accordance with those of Dr` eze and Malinvaud
et al. (1994), Phelps (1997) and Mortensen and Pissarides (2003). We have also il-
lustrated that the eﬃciency of employment subsidies can be reinforced by reforms to
active and passive labor market policies. We have developed an extensive sensitivity
analysis which suggests that these conclusions are robust.
There are some caveats to add concerning the following limitations of our theoretical
framework. First, employment subsidies inﬂuence training and schooling decisions
made by individuals and ﬁrms (Blundell, Costas Dias and Meghir, 2003). Second,
employment subsidies aﬀect job destruction rates (Mortensen and Pissarides, 2003).
23If they are targeted on low productivity jobs, such subsidies have a clear-cut negative
eﬀect on job destruction rates. Third, there is evidence that skilled workers supply
labor on less-skilled labor markets (ladder eﬀect) and that this phenomenon reduces
the eﬀectiveness of employment subsidies (Sneessens, 2005). These two last features
have been combined in the model of Pierrard (2005), who concludes that employment
subsidies targeted on low-paid workers have substantial positive eﬀects on employment
and on welfare. Fourth, it has been argued that employment subsidies targeted on
low-skilled workers lock them in low-paid jobs. A model with on-the-job search and
additional skill categories could take such an eﬀect into account. Finally, for several
years now, countries such as France, Germany, The Netherlands and Belgium have
played a non-cooperative game to maintain their competitiveness. Cuts in payroll
taxes are among the instruments used. Our analysis has only been conducted for a
single (closed) economy.
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28Appendixes
A Proof that VT,n >V U,n >V X,n
Let us recall the assumptions: 1 >ρ T,n ≥ ρU,n >ρ X,n,c T,n >c n,γ n ≥ 0,λ n ≥ 0,π n >
0. Let bU,n = ρU,n · wn + zn. bX,n and bT,n are deﬁned similarly. We now distinguish
the case where participation to the ALMP is chosen freely and the one where there is
a treat to be sanctioned in case of refusal.
Case 1: Free participation (V U,n = max(VT,n,V U,n))
Let us prove that VU,n >V X,n.I f VU,n was lower or equal to VX,n and sU,n was
optimally chosen by the unemployed, the following inequalities would hold:
rVU,n =bU,n − d(sU,n)+cnsU,nα(θn)(VE,n − VU,n)+γn(V U,n − VU,n)+πn(VX,n − VU,n)
>b X,n − d(sX,n)+cn sX,nα(θn)(VE,n − VX,n + VX,n − VU,n)+γn(V U,n − VU,n)
+ πn(VX,n − VU,n)
≥bX,n − d(sX,n)+cn sX,nα(θn)(VE,n − VX,n)+γn(V U,n − VU,n)
(31)
Several possibilities should be considered. Each of them should lead to a contradiction.
Case 1.1. VT,n ≥ VX,n ≥ VU,n
Then, V U,n = V X,n = VT,n. The RHS of (31) is higher than or equal to
bX,n − d(sX,n)+cn sX,nα(θn)(VE,n − VX,n)+γn(V U,n − VX,n)
=bX,n − d(sX,n)+cn sX,nα(θn)(VE,n − VX,n)+γn(V X,n − VX,n)
=rVX,n
(32)
if sX,n is the optimal level of search (this condition is not recalled below). This leads
to a contradiction. Therefore, VU,n >V X,n.
Case 1.2. VX,n ≥ VU,n ≥ VT,n
Then, V U,n = VU,n and V X,n = VX,n. The RHS of (31) is then equal to
bX,n − d(sX,n)+cn sX,nα(θn)(VE,n − VX,n),
which is again rVX,n because those in the second tier refuse to take part to the program.
So, again, there is a contradiction. Therefore, VU,n >V X,n.
Case 1.3. VX,n >V T,n >V U,n
29The RHS of (31) is then equal to
bX,n − d(sX,n)+cn sX,nα(θn)(VE,n − VX,n)+γn(VT,n − VU,n)
≥bX,n − d(sX,n)+cn sX,nα(θn)(VE,n − VX,n)=rVX,n
(33)
This leads once more to a contradiction. Therefore, VU,n >V X,n.
Knowing that VU,n >V X,n, let us now prove that VT,n >V U,n.I fVU,n was higher than
or equal to VT,n and sT,n was optimally chosen by the trainee, the following inequalities
would be veriﬁed:
rVT,n = bT,n − d(sT,n)+cT,nsT,nα(θn)(VE,n − VT,n)+λn(VU,n − VT,n)
≥ bT,n − d(sU,n)+cn sU,n α(θn)(VE,n − VU,n + VU,n − VT,n)
>b U,n − d(sU,n)+cn sU,n α(θn)(VE,n − VU,n)+πn(VX,n − VU,n) (34)
As VT,n ≤ VU,n, V U,n = VU,n. So, adding γn(V U,n − VU,n) to the RHS of (34) does
not modify this expression. The RHS of (34) is then equal to rVU,n. This leads to a
contradiction. So, VT,n >V U,n.
Case 2: Participation under threat of a sanction in the ﬁrst tier (V U,n = max(VT,n,V X,n))
Then, V U,n = V X,n. Let us prove that VU,n >V X,n.I f VU,n was lower or equal
to VX,n and sU,n was optimally chosen by the unemployed, the following inequalities
would hold:
rVU,n =bU,n − d(sU,n)+cnsU,nα(θn)(VE,n − VU,n)+γn(V U,n − VU,n)+πn(VX,n − VU,n)
>b X,n − d(sX,n)+cn sX,nα(θn)(VE,n − VX,n + VX,n − VU,n)+γn(V U,n − VU,n)
+ πn(VX,n − VU,n)
≥bX,n − d(sX,n)+cn sX,nα(θn)(VE,n − VX,n)+γn(V U,n − VX,n + VX,n − VU,n)
≥bX,n − d(sX,n)+cn sX,nα(θn)(VE,n − VX,n)+γn(V X,n − VX,n)=rVX,n,
(35)
which leads to a contradiction. So, VU,n >V X,n.
To show that VT,n >V U,n, let us start from (34). Under the assumption that VT,n is
lower than or equal to VU,n, two sub-cases should be distinguished: VT,n ≤ VX,n <V U,n
and VX,n <V T,n ≤ VU,n.
Case 2.1 VT,n ≤ VX,n <V U,n
30Since VT,n ≤ VX,n, V U,n − VU,n = VX,n − VU,n < 0. All the unemployed reject the
oﬀers to take part to the program. Therefore, the RHS of (34):
bU,n − d(sU,n)+cn sU,n α(θn)(VE,n − VU,n)+πn(VX,n − VU,n)
≥ bU,n − d(sU,n)+cn sU,n α(θn)(VE,n − VU,n)+πn(VX,n − VU,n)+γn(V U,n − VU,n)
= rVU,n.
There is again a contradiction. So, VT,n >V U,n.
Case 2.2. VX,n <V T,n ≤ VU,n
Then V U,n = max(VT,n;VX,n)=VT,n. Those who are in the ﬁrst tier prefer to take
part to the program but they lose since V U,n − VU,n = VT,n − VU,n < 0. Therefore the
RHS of (34):
bU,n − d(sU,n)+cn sU,n α(θn)(VE,n − VU,n)+πn(VX,n − VU,n)
≥ bU,n − d(sU,n)+cn sU,n α(θn)(VE,n − VU,n)+πn(VX,n − VU,n)+γn(V U,n − VU,n)
= rVU,n.
There is once more a contradiction. So, VT,n >V U,n.
To show that VE,n >V T,n >V U,n >V X,n, we still have to prove the ﬁrst inequality.
This will be done in Appendix B.
B Precise speciﬁcation of various equations
The steady-state relationshipdeﬁning the emp loyment level En is:
En = E(θn,Sn) ≡ Ln [[cT,nsT,nα(θn)+λn](cnsU,nα(θn)[cnsX,nα(θn)+γn]






+ πn [cnsX,nα(θn)+φn]) + γn [cT,nsT,nα(θn)+φn][πn + cnsX,nα(θn)+γn].
(37)
Let
∆1,n ≡ (r + cnsX,nα(θn)+γn)[[r + cnsU,nα(θn)+φn][r + cT,nsT,nα(θn)+λn]
+ γn[r + cT,nsT,nα(θn)+φn]] + πn[[r + cT,nsT,nα(θn)+λn][r + cnsX,nα(θn)+φn]
+ γn[r + cT,nsT,nα(θn)+φn]],
∆2,n ≡ r + πn + cnsX,nα(θn)+γn,
∆3,n ≡ r + cT,nsT,nα(θn)+λn + γn. (38)
31Let δET,n ≡ wn −vT,n > 0 and διι,n ≡ vι,n −vι,n,ι,ι   ∈{ U,X,T},ι = ι . The following
diﬀerences can be derived from Equations (4), (24), (26) and (25):
VE,n − VU,n =[ ( r + cT,nsT,nα(θn)+λn)[(r + cnsX,nα(θn)+γn)(wn − vU,n)
+πn(wn − vX,n)] + γn (r + πn + cnsX,nα(θn)+γn)wn − vT,n)]∆
−1
1,n, (39)
VU,n − VX,n =[ δUX,n+ cn(sU,n − sX,n)α(θn)(VE,n − VU,n)]∆
−1
2,n, (40)
VT,n − VU,n =[ ( r + cnsX,nα(θn)+γn)(δTU,n+( cT,nsT,n − cnsU,n)α(θn))(VE,n − VU,n))
+πn (δTX,n+( cT,nsT,n − cnsX,n)α(θn))(VE,n − VU,n))][∆2,n∆3,n]
−1, (41)
VE,n − VT,n =[ δET,n +( λn − φn)(VT,n − VU,n)]∆
−1
4,n. (42)
So, if φn <λ n, one has VE,n >V T,n.
Search-eﬀort levels verify the following (suﬃcient) conditions:
d
 (sU,n)=cn α(θn)(VE,n − VU,n), (43)
d
 (sX,n)=cn α(θn)(VE,n − VX,n), (44)
d
 (sT,n)=cT,nα(θn)(VE,n − VT,n). (45)
Under free-entry, the Nash bargain over wages leads to:











Equation (4) can be used to replace VE,n − VU,n by (wn − rVU,n)/(r + φn). So,
wn = rVU,n +( r + φn)V(θn). (47)
Finally, one has to replace rVU,n in the previous equality. This task is more complex
because the number of possible positions on the labor market is larger than in Section
2.1. It leads to the following explicit function for the wage:
wn = WS(θn,Sn) ≡
 





with ι ∈{ U,X,T} and
ΩU,n ≡ [r + cT,nsT,nα(θn)+λn][r + γn + cnsX,nα(θn)]/∆5,n
ΩT,n ≡ γn [r + γn + cnsX,nα(θn)+πn]/∆5,n
ΩX,n ≡ πn [r + cT,nsT,nα(θn)+λn]/∆5,n
∆5,n ≡ [r + cT,nsT,nα(θn)+λn + γn][r + γn + cnsX,nα(θn)+πn]
32and ΩU,n +Ω T,n+Ω X,n = 1. As in the model of Section 2.1, it can be shown that this
curve is not aﬀected by marginal changes in search eﬀort levels.
In a symmetric equilibrium, Expression (46) can be substituted for VE,n − VU,n in
the ﬁrst-order conditions (43), (44) and (45) in which VU,n−VX,n has ﬁrst been replaced
by (40) and VT,n − VU,n by (41). After some manipulation, this leads for each n to:
ΣU(θn,s U,n) ≡ d
 (sU,n) − cn α(θn)V(θn)=0 , (49)
ΣX(θn,s U,n,s X,n) = 0 (50)
with ΣX ≡ ∆2,n d
 (sX,n) − cn α(θn)[δUX,n +( ∆ 2,n + cn [sU,n − sX,n]α(θn)) V(θn)],
ΣT(θn,s U,n,s X,n,s T,n) = 0 (51)
with ΣT ≡ ∆2,n ∆3,n d
 (sT,n) − cT,nα(θn)[(∆ 2,n ∆3,n − [r + cn sX,nα(θn)+γn]
[cT,nsT,n − cn sU,n]α(θn) − πn[cT,nsT,n − cn sX,n]α(θn))V(θn)
− (r + cnsX,nα(θn)+γn) δTU,n − πn δTX,n].
Totally diﬀerentiating equations (49), (50) and (51), it can be checked that ∂Σι
∂sι =
0 ∀ι,ι  ∈{ { T,n},{X,n},{U,n}},ι = ι . Moreover, the levels of search eﬀort of type-n
workers increase with tightness θn and decrease with the tax rate τn.
Expression (44) implies that sX,n increases with the gain VE,n − VX,n = VE,n −
VU,n + VU,n − VX,n = V(θn)+VU,n − VX,n.A s VT,n >V U,n >V X,n, those in state Xn
gain more from the ALMP than those in Un. Therefore, Van der Linden (2005) shows
that VU,n − VX,n shrinks with γn and so does sX,n (conditional on θn). From (45), sT,n
increases with the gain VE,n − VT,n = V(θn) − (VT,n − VU,n). Van der Linden (2005)
shows that VT,n−VU,n shrinks with γn (conditional on θn). And so, the direct eﬀect of
γn on sT,n is positive.
C Comparative static analysis
The equilibrium eﬀect of a marginal change in γl can be measured by diﬀerentiating
the following system where (θl,θ h) are the endogenous variables and γl is the parameter
of interest here:
VS l(θl,θ h | γl) − WS l(θl | γl)=0
VS h(θl,θ h | γl) − WS h(θh)=0 (52)
In these equations,
VS n(θn,θ m) ≡
pn yn − an − (r + φn)(kn/q(θn))
1+τn
33in which pn is written as a function of both tightness levels. More precisely, remem-




in which Sn is a function of θn and, if n = l,o fγl (see (49) to (51)).35 Moreover,
the function E(θl,Sl) is inﬂuenced by γl (see again (36)). In System (52), the WS n
functions are deﬁned by (48).36 As can be seen from this deﬁnition, γl inﬂuences WS l
conditional on θl.

































  < 0. (53)
Consider ﬁrst the matrix at the numerator. We know that
∂WSl




















Looking at equation (36) we have that
∂El
∂γl > 0i fcT,lsT,l is “suﬃciently larger” than
clsU,l and clsX,l.37 However, the direct eﬀects of γl on sU,l is nil, on sX,l is negative
and on sT,l is positive (see the end of Appendix B). So, in (54), the sign of the sum
35Looking at these equations, it turns out that conditional on tightness, sU,n is not aﬀected by γn.
36In which again Sn is a function of θn but this does not matter since marginal changes in search









πn(cT,nsT,nα(θn)+λn + γn)cn(sU,n − sX,n)α(θn)
+( πn + cnsX,nα(θn)+γn)
 
(cnsX,nα(θn)+γn)(cT,nsT,n − cnsU,n)α(θn)
+ πn(cT,nsT,n − cnsX,n)α(θn))
  
≥ 0i f cT,nsT,n is suﬃcientlylarger than cnsU,n and cnsX,n
< 0i f cT,nsT,n <c nsU,n and cT,nsT,n <c nsX,n
34between brackets is ambiguous. Therefore, it can be checked that the sign of dθl/dγl
is in general ambiguous, too.
Let us however assume that the expression between brackets in (54) is nonnegative.
Then,
∂VSl
∂γl is nonpositive since
∂pl




∂γl < 0 . Moreover then,
∂VSh
∂γl
38 is nonnegative since
∂ph
∂El > 0. It can easily be checked that
∂VSl















the numerator in (53) is then positive, too. So does the denominator. Therefore, we
conclude that
dθl
dγl is negative if the direct eﬀect of γl on El (i.e. the expression between
brackets in (54)) is nonnegative.
To check the sign of
dθh








      
−
∂VSh













      
−
. (55)
We are not able to sign the determinant at the numerator. So, the marginal eﬀect of




















p · y (Euro/month) 3300 4200
k 18211 41442
ρU = bU/w 0.55 0.55
















sU (cs U α(θ)) 0.16 (0.03) 0.39 (0.08)
sX (cs X α(θ)) 0.20 (0.04) 0.49 (0.10)
sT (cT sT α(θ)) 0.26 (0.06) 0.55 (0.12)
θ 2.22 0.83
V/(U + X + T) 0.09 0.14
w (Euro/month) 1229 1512
Table 1. Calibration: Parameters and levels of endogenous variables in steadystate.
θ E w sU sX rV E rV U rV X
σ =1 .1 l +1.95 +4.97 +3.90 +11.43 +11.43 +5.15 +6.10 +6.13
h -0.43 -0.66 -1.39 -2.40 -2.44 -1.64 -1.86 -1.87
σ =2 l +1.25 +3.18 +2.53 +7.22 +7.22 +3.33 +3.93 +3.95
h -0.28 -0.43 -0.91 -1.58 -1.61 -1.08 -1.22 -1.23
Table 2. Properties when the marginal values of labor are ﬁxed (the M-P assumption)
compared to those when theyvary(relative diﬀerences in %): The case of an employ ment
subsidy al = −300 Euro/month when the budget of the State (28) is ignored. The elasticity
of substitution of the aggregate production function, σ, takes two values: 1.1 and 2.e w rV E rV U rV X
πn =1 /12 l 0.647 1337 960 792 788
πn =1 /3 l 0.659 1368 981 809 807
πn =1 /12 h 0.754 1562 1306 1136 1130
πn =1 /3 h 0.762 1617 1354 1178 1176
Table 3. Properties of an employment subsidy al = −300 Euro/month when the budget of
the State (28) is balanced and the expected duration of “high” beneﬁts, 1/πn, equals 12 or 3
months.
e w rV E rV U rV X
With active program l 0.647 1337 960 792 788
Without l 0.658 1365 981 810 805
With active program h 0.754 1562 1306 1136 1130
Without h 0.761 1606 1344 1169 1163
Table 4. Properties of an employment subsidy al = −300 Euro/month when the budget of
the State (28) is balanced and the active program is either present or abandoned.θ h
θ l
Gh (θ h ,  θ l = 0 )
Gl  ( θ l , θ h  = 0)
Gl = 0
Gh = 0






 sold in a competitive
market
Final good representative firm Y = F ( Ql , Qh )
cl  s U,l   α  (θ l)
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φ l
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Figure 3: The tax wedge (measured as the ratio between the wage cost and the net
wage) on single persons without children at 67% of average earnings. Source: OECD
Taxing wages.
Figure 4: The relative tax wedge (measured as the ratio between the wage cost and
the net wage): Single persons without children at 67% of average earnings compared

















Range of sectoral minimum monthly 
gross bargained wages
Figure 5: Total rate of social security contributions in % of the gross wage as a function
of the monthly gross wages (truncated at 5000 Euros/month): Belgium in 2005, the





















































































































































Figure 6: Various indicators as a function of al in 1000 Euro. Interrupted (resp., thick)
lines: The case where the budget constraint (28) is ignored (resp. binding).Département des Sciences Économiques
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